Introduction
In this chapter, I argue that the European Employment Strategy (EES) has been increasingly influenced by a punitive approach towards the unemployed. This proposition challenges the thrust of the literature, which posits that the EU promotes a distinctively 'soft' touch towards the unemployed and stays clear of the workfarist approach which characterises US welfare policies since 1996 (Hemerijck, 2002; Wincott, 2003a) . Evidence shows that the advocates of the social dimension at the Lisbon summit in 2000 are loosing ground both within the European Commission and within the European Council, for four reasons. First, unemployment rose in the EU 15, from 7.5 per cent in 2001 to 8.2 per cent in 2003, thus casting serious doubts on the capacity of the EU to reach the employment target rate of 67 per cent by 2005 (Kok et al., 2003 . Second, the advocates of neo-liberal policies gained renewed political influence to the detriment of the supporters of the social inclusion approach. Third, centre-left parties were affected by a series of electoral defeats, especially in France, Denmark and the Netherlands. This swing to the right meant that the advocates of 'capitalism with a human face' became extremely marginalised at the EU level, as the neo-liberal stance of the Barroso Commission made it clear. Fourth, several member states launched a political offensive against the Commission in 2002 by calling for the establishment of an intergovernmental Employment Task Force in order to review the Employment Strategy in the light of Europe's poor employment performance. This initiative represented an attack against the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). It is too early to tell whether this new turn amounts to a third-order paradigmatic change (Hall, 1993) or is simply cosmetic and incremental. Indeed, the EES is based on an extremely polysemic discourse which can be adapted to different audiences: Third Way Social Democrats, neo-liberals, and social partners. For instance, the emphasis on economic competitiveness formed a crucial dimension of the EES. Nevertheless, there was also a political will to reaffirm the need to fight against poverty and social exclusion, as well as a concern with the quality of employment. These concerns were relegated to a secondary position in the new version of the EES.
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, the role of the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG V) in the formulation of the EES is briefly explained. In particular, I argue that an heterogeneous policy coalition with temporary coinciding interests played a key role in the formulation of the EES and the OMC. Second, I analyse how this coalition broke down, mainly as a result of the shift to the right both within member states and within the Commission itself. The fact that the EES had produced mixed results led to the design of a revised strategy which hollowed out the social dimension of the EES. In the remaining section, I examine the formulation of the new employment guidelines . I argue that the implementation of workfarist approaches based on the need to lower social assistance benefits and make work pay became dominant within DGV.
The EES and the emergence of a social liberal discourse
The development of the EES can be analysed as part of the series of trials and errors which characterise the development of EU social policy (Geyer, 2000; de la Porte and Pochet, 2002) . Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG V) is a weak DG in comparison to Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin). DG Vis involved in constant internal struggles with other directorates that are institutionally in a much stronger position since they represent the core competencies of the EU (regulatory policies, competition, internal affairs). Historically DG Vis subordinated to DG Ecfin and must find external alliances among trade unions and NGOs to promote employment and social policies which are not part of the core competencies of the EU. This structural weakness is one of the reasons why DG V financially supports the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN). DG V, the European Anti-Poverty Network, some members of ETUC form a loose issue network which promotes 'progressive' employment and social policies, but they have limited room for
